University of Dayton Review
Volume 8
Number 3 Winter

Article 7

1971

The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead's
Philosophy
David Griffin
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr

Recommended Citation
Griffin, David (1971) "The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead's Philosophy," University of
Dayton Review: Vol. 8: No. 3, Article 7.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udr/vol8/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Dayton Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more information, please contact
mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

Griffin: The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead's Philosop

The Possibility of Subjective Immortality
in Whitehead's Philosophy
David Griffin

As far as the idea of immortality is concerned, Alfred North Whitehead was
primarily interested in the idea of " objective" immortality, the idea that all the
experiences, especially all the values we finite actualities achieve , are vividly preserved and treasured everlastingly by the divine actuality. He spoke only rarely
about "subjective" immortality, i.e. , the issue as to whether the human subject
might continue to have experiences after bodily death. However, he did say that
his philosophy was "entirely neutral" on this question .! By this he meant that
his view did not entail that the human soul was necessarily immortal, on the one
hand , nor that its immortality was ontologically impossible, on the other.
The purpose of this paper is to explain, as clearly as possible for those unfamili ar with Whitehead 's philosophy, how it allows for the possibility of subjective immortality. As Whitehead recognized, if one's ontology is neutral on the
qu estion , there is no reason why the question should not be decided on the basis
of "more special.evidence, " if there be any that is trustworthy. But the ontological
considerations are not thereby useless, for few of us will accept anything as
really being evidence, no matter how well attested , if it falls outside the bounds
of what our ontologies, explicit or implicit, allow as possible. 2 If such phenomena
appear in disciplines that have achieved respectability, we call them "anomalies;"
if they are discovered in a more suspect field of inquiry, we use a less dignified
word.
There are many reasons for the decline in modern times of belief in life after
death. Of central importance are some strictly philosophical assumptions about the
nature of man. The rather common-sense dualistic view of man's soul as ontologically different in kind from material entities, of which his body is composed,
fell into disrepute. It was found to be impossible in principle to account for the
interaction between material substances, which occupy space, are impenetrable,
and op erate totally in terms of efficient causation, and a purely spiritual entity,
which occupies no space, has no solidity, and must be thought to operate in terms
of final causation. Hence, philosophies which began with this dualistic premise
were either radically incoherent, insofar as they could not intelligibly account
for the interaction of the mind and body (Descartes). or radically incredible, insofar
as they tried to overcome the incoherence by denying the reality of the interaction
(Male branche).
Partly because of these difficulties , many have accepted a view of man in which
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the mind or soul is not a full-fledged actuality. This may be based primarily on
an ontological materialism, in line with Thomas Hobbes, in which case the term
"mind" is merely a short-hand designation for some functions performed by
the brain, or at most refers to some "epiphenomenon" or by-product of the brain.
In any case, the mind is not an entity belonging to the privileged class of the
"really real." Or this denial may be based more upon epistemological considerations.
Many, in line with the empirical principle that non-experienced entities should
not be affirmed, and in fact cannot be meaningfully discussed, follow Hume
in denying the experiencedness, and hence the meaningfulness, and thus by
implication the reality, of the human souP
In the later developments of the philosophical tradition rooted primarily in
the British empiricists, this denial may be based, ostensibly at least, more upon
linguistic than upon ontological or epistemological considerations. For example,
it has been claimed that thinking of the mind as a distinct reality is a "category
mistake," parallel to thinking of "the University" as an entity distinct from, and
thereby in the same category as, its various parts, whereas the truth is that the
term "University" simply refers to the organization of the various parts. We are
said to use the term "mind" simply to refer to the organization of the brain for
certain functions. 4
In any case, whether the starting point is considered to be ontological,
epistemological, or linguistic, the implication of much modern thought is the
same, so far as the question of immortality is concerned: the mind is not considered as an actuality with even any partial autonomy in relation to the body,
but either as in some sense identical with the body or brain, or at least some
aspects of its behavior, or at most a non-efficacious by-product of the same.
Hence the question of the psyche's survival of the body's death cannot be
meaningfully entertained. And as long as some such view of man is held, no
potentially falsifying evidence would be accepted as genuine. Even if twelve of
the most hard-headed members of the American Philosophical Association were
to claim independently to have chatted last evening with Thomas Hobbes, David
Hume, and Bertrand Russell, most of the rest of the membership would remain
incredulous, seeking some "natural" explanation for the coincidence, and regretting the departure of their twelve brethren from the ranks of the trustworthy.
I. ACTUAL OCCASIONS AND SERIALLY ORDERED SOCIETIES
The first relevant point about Whitehead 's philosophy is that he is neither
a dualist nor a materialist, and is yet a pluralistic realist. He has only one type of
actual entities, and these entities are all occasions of experience. "Experience"
here emphatically should not be equated with sense experience, or consciousness.
Only a relatively few actual occasions have these very high-grade forms of experience. Whitehead's nearest ancestor here is Leibniz, with his monads that
were all the same ontologically or structurally, but varied greatly in degree of perception. However, Leibniz denied causal interaction between his monads-they
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were "windowless," and hence did not really "perceive" each other. Whitehead
holds that each actual entity is temporally short, as well as spatially atomic .
Each occasion begins as an open window, so to speak, and unifies the data received from its environment into an experienced unity. Hence, each occasion
of experience begins by perceiving (Whitehead prefers to say "prehending")
other occasions. And "perception" at this low level is simply the reverse side of
efficient causality. That is , if A is one of the efficient causes of B, then B
"prehends" A.
What are examples of these actual occasions, or occasions of experience? The
only example you know immediately is yourself in this moment. However,
Whitehead does not mean that the total figure that you see in the mirror is an
autual entity. This way of approaching the "really real" would be to take the data
of sense experience as primary, which is precisely what Whitehead is rejecting.
Rather he means to point you to that experience which is "yo u" at this momentthat total experience which brings into a unity your memories, emotions, purposes,
anticipations, bodily feelings, and sense experience. This total experience here
and now is an occasion of experience, and lhis is his paradigm for indicating what
he means by an actual entity. All other actual entities are to be thought in analogy
with this immediately experienced really real thing.
This idea is so different from what we consider common sense that it is difficult
to grasp. (My impression is that it is more difficult to grasp, than it is to accept
once it has been graspe d. But in any case, my purpose in this paper is to try to
explain, not to defend .) Whitehead does not suggest that you derive your notions
about the real in the first place from what you touch and see. The objects
that are experienced or inferred in this way are considered by Whitehead to
be mere abstractions or aggregates. Rather than taking some part of the content
of your experience as the real, or as a basis for making inferences about the
real, you should take the total experience itself, with its full content, objective
and subjective, and its unity. As Whitehead puts it, "the percipient occasion
is its own standard of actuality. "5
But can one make sense of the world in general, and of the total human being
in particular, on the basis of this starting point? If the human body is not an
actual entity, what is it? And if the mind is an actuality, and the body is something different, does not Whitehead face the same mind-body problem as
Descartes? And what other things could be actual entities, analogous to the
psyche? Furthermore, it was said above that that an actual entity is an occasion
of experience, hence temporally short, whereas "I" seem to endure through time.
So is even the mind not an actual entity?
I will begin with the latter two questions. Actual occasions tend to organize
themselves into "serially ordered societies," or synonymously, "enduring objects."6
The human psyche is such. It is a "society" because it is constituted by many
actual occasions which have a definite order. This order is constituted by a certain form which each of the occasions derives from its predecessors and passes
on to its successors. But in each such society there is only one member (actual
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occasion) at a time, hence the only order is serial (as opposed to being also
spatial). A thing that endures through time , such as a human psyche, is hence not
simply an actual entity, but is a serially ordered society of such.
Other examples of serially ordered societies, or enduring objects, are electrons,
protons, atoms, and molecules. Each of these would be constituted by a series of
electronic, protonic, atomic, and molecular occasions, respectively. Although an
electron can no longer be though of in the old way, as being analogous to a billiard
ball, and hence as simply a "substance ," in the sense of that which is an ontological unity in the strictest sense, it nevertheless has a real unity, in that each
electronic occasion almost totally reiterates the form of its predecessor. Hence,
we can say that such and such electron is the same electron we were speaking
of yesterday. The self-identity through time is constituted by the common
form that informs the energy of each occasion in the series, and the fact that it
is passed along causally from occasion to occasion.
There is no absolute necessity that actual occasions be organized into these
enduring objects. In fact, what we call "empty space" is filled (or really, constituted) by occasions that are not ordered into these chains, but simply occur
chaotically. And Whitehead suggests that the "creation" of our present universe
simply involved bringing order out of this relative chaos. The first stage in
creation, then, would have involved bringing significant numbers of serially
ordered societies into existence.
But why should this order be brought about? The key lies in the conditions
for value. A large part of what is implied in defining actual entities as occasions
of experience is the denial that there are any "vacuous actualities." Although
conscious and sense experience cannot be attributed to all actual entities, Whitehead held that value experience can be thus generalized. In line with the Platonic
view that to be is good, Whitehead saw each actual occasion as having intrinsic
value, as being something for itself (prior to its having instrumental value for
others). He said, "Value is the term I use for the intrinsic reality of an event."?
But if the random happenings in empty space have self-value, why is bringing
order out of this chaos necessary? Because actualities can enjoy more or less
value. The value enjoyed by occasions in empty space must be thought to be
extremely slight. The ordering into enduring objects Whitehead sees as the
first step in the direction of increasing the conditions of value. The common
form , spoken of above, that constitutes the self-identity of an enduring object,
is a form of value. This reiteration of a particular type of value contributes
intensity to the individual members of the series, and thereby increases the value
experience, even if only slightly.s Also, the more intrinsic value an entity has for
itself, the more value it has to contribute instrumentally to the intrinsic value of
others.
II. MORE COMPLEX SOCIETIES

The next step in understanding Whitehead 's view of man is to consider the
more complicated ways in which actual occasions can be ordered. I mentioned
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earlier that atoms are enduring objects, which means they are constituted by a
series of atomic actual entities. But we know that electrons and protons are in
some sense "inside" the atom. Hence it would seem as if actual entities at one
level (electronic and protonic occasions) are inside the actual entities at a higher
level. Remembering that "actual entity" is Whitehead's replacement for the term
"substance," to designate that which is an individual in the strictest sense, this
would mean that one individual would actually include other individuals.
And this is exactly Whitehead's view. Besides the most basic unities of nature,
there are also unities of unities. 9 The atom is not simply the sum of its parts (in
which case it would not be a real unity, but merely an aggregate), but is a new
series of occasions at a higher level. It included its parts, without thereby destroying their individuality, and yet transcends them, being a more inclusive
unity of experience. Likewise, the molecule is not simply the sum of its atomic
parts, but a new level of unity. Hence, Whitehead is akin to the emergent evolutionists , who hold that the evolutionary process does not simply involve more
and more complex reorganizations of some primal actualities, but also the coming
into being of new, more complex, actualities. And each new stage means an increase in the degree of value attainable. For example, each molecular occasion
received value not only from the predecessor molecular occasion, but also from
its subordinate parts. The more complex is the organization out of which the
occasions of experience emerge, the greater the value that can be enjoyed.
However, up to this point the increase in value must be quite trivial, and we
must admit that we are stretching words such as " experience" and "value" almost
to the breaking· point in applying them analogically to these low-grade entities.
(The actual breaking point would be where analogy became equivocation.) Besides,
where we speak of evolution, we generally have biological evolution, and therefore life, in mind. How are we to understand the living cell?
Whitehead sees the emergence of the cell as a dramatic breakthrough. For,
although entities such as electrons and molecules are not to be thought of as totally
inert and vacuous, neither do they really deserve the name "living," since the
degree of spontaneity and novelty they embody is almost negligible. For the
most part they simply repeat the past. But the cell is called "living" precisely
because it is not enclaved to the past. Of course the cell includes molecules, which
are enduring objects with little novelty. But in the so-called "empty spaces" of
the cell, there occur living occasions. Hence, the cell is no mere aggregate, no mere
sum of its molecular parts. It is a new emergent, and in each moment has the
unity of an occasion of experience.
At this point the terms " structured society" and "nexus" (plural nexus) must
be introduced. A structured society is one than contains subordinate societies
and nexus. Nexus is a more general term than society; it refers to any sort of
togetherness to merit the term society. Hence, all societies are nexus, but some
nexus are not socially ordered. In a structured society, those subordinate enduring
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members that could survive apart from the environment provided by the structured society as a whole are called subordinate societies. Those which cannot
be thought thus to survive are termed subordinate nexus. Hence the atom is a
structured society, and its electrons and protons are subordinate societies. Also
the cell is a structured society. The molecules it contains are subordinate societies.
Outside the cell they would be somewhat different, since their immediate environment would be different; but they would still maintain their molecular
integrity. However, Whitehead did not consider the living occasions of the
cell to form a (serially ordered) society, but merely a nexus. There seemed to him
no reason to believe that there was a thread of serial order passed along from one
living occasion to the next. Rather, each such occasion seems to live for the
moment, rather than inheriting a tradition from the past and projecting purposes
into the future. Each cellular occasion has an intensity of experience, and achieves
a degree of value, greatly exceeding that of any and all of its subordinate societies.
But this value experience is " the clutch of vivid immediacy,"10 without the values
involved in repetition, tradition, and sustained purposiveness.
At this point, before continuing up the hierarchy, some more terms must be
introduced. There are two ways for a multiplicity of beings such as molecules and
cells to be ordered among themselves. On the one hand they can join together into
a new society in which all the members are on the same level. The society is
hence a "democracy." For molecules this means being ordered into such things as
sticks and stones. Democratic societies of cells we call plants.
On the other hand, the entities can be ordered in such a way that a new nexus
of occasions, on a higher level, emerges. The emergence of the cell out of the
molecules has already been mentioned. When the cells themselves are ordered to
provide the conditions for the emergence of a new set of higher-level occasions
of experience, the result is a "monarchical society, " although people unversed
in Whiteheadianese simply speak of animals. The monarch of the society is a
nexus of occasions which inherit richly from at least a majority of the subordinate
members, and which likewise exercise a dominating influence (although not
·complete control) over the society as a whole .
Of course, the dividing line between plants and animals cannot be precisely
indicated. And yet, except for those beings on the borderline, the difference is
rather clear cut, especially when one compares a carrot and an animal with a
central nervous system. What is achieved is a new breakthrough. "Psyche" is
not simply another name for the brain, or certain of its functions. It refers to a
new series of actual occasions just as "real" as electronic, molecular, and cellular
occasions. Like Leibniz, Whitehead has only one genus of actual entities, differing only in degree. There is no reason to think of the lower-grade ones as
more real than the higher-grade. Whitehead's psyche, monarch, or "regnant
nexus" is Leibniz's "dominant monad," except that the coordination between the
psyche and its body is not due to a pre-established harmony engineered by a
deistic creator, but is the result of real interaction.
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III. THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

The intelligibility of this real interaction, the so-called mind-body problem, is
obviously central to whether or not Whitehead's philosophy provides for the
possibility of immortality. The view that the psyche is really an actuality is a
necessary condition for this possibility. But his view of the psyche as distinct
from the brain must be free from the kinds of problems that led to the widespread
rejection of the Cartesian position in favor of some type of identity theory.
Thus far the terms "physical" and "mental " have not been used. For Descartes
the body was a physical substance and the mind a mental substance. This is what
"Cartesian dualism" refers to , and it is only to such a position that the term
"dualism" should be applied. It only breeds confusion to call dualistic any view
which holds that the psyche is an entity distinct from that multiplicity of entities
(cells) called the brain. Leibniz was no dualist , and neither is Whitehead. For
him , the terms physical and mental refer not to two different types of actual
entities, but to two aspects of every occasion of experience. The "physical"
aspect is the receptive phase of the occasion, the phase in which it, for the most
part, simply receives that which is provided for it. The term "mental" is stretched
beyond its normal use to refer to the novelty appearing in an occasion. Hence,
low-grade occasions are almost totally physical, insofar as they simply receive
data from the past, repeat it, and pass it along virtually unchanged. Any novelty
is negligible. The living cell is the first level at which significant novelty occurshence the adjective "living."
For Whitehead, it belongs to the very nature of an actual entity that it internally
takes account of, or prehends, the other actual occasions in its environment. One
entity exerts causal influence on another not by bumping into it (as in the old
impact theory, based on the billiard-ball analogy). but simply by being there to
be prehended by the other. (Although this by itself gives a too static notion of
an actual occasion, which is essentially activity. There is a sense in which each
occasion "throws itself" at its successors, thereby helping create them: "The
creativity of the world is the throbbing emotion of the past hurling itself into a
new transcendent fact.")t2
Accordingly, the mind-body problem in its traditional form does not arise .
The mind is not a non-spatial, purely mental perceiving thing trying to be related
to some spatial, purely physical non-perceiving things that normally interact
causally in terms of mechanistic impact. Rather, each occasion of the mind's
experience is a unification of the data provided for it by actual occasions in
its immediate past, these being primarily the brain's cellular occasions occurring
a split-second before. The principle is the same as in all causation. Just as the
physical phase of each brain cell consists of a set of prehensions of other entities
(such as its subordinate members, adjacent cells and previous occasion of the
psyche). the physical phase of the psyche is constituted by a set of prehensions
of all the entities in its environment. However, the mental phase of the psyche
is much more significant than it is in the cells. Included in the psyche's mental
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phase is a set of decisions for the bodily members . The brain cells than prehend
the psyche in terms of these aims, and transmit them with more or less faithfulness to the various parts of the body.
Hence , the facile assumption of many philosophers, that epiphenomenolism
and dualism are the only alternatives, so that any view which holds that the
psyche is an actuality distinct from the brain must necessarily have all the notorious difficulties of dualism, is shown by Whitehead to be erroneous. The
brain is an aggregate (a democratic society) composed of billions of real individuals,
bringing the data received from all the actualities in its environment (its own
past, the brain cells, God, and perhaps other psyches) into a coherent unity of
experience. The principles involved in this interaction are no different from the
principles involved in all causal relations: the many become one- a unity arises
out of a multiplicity, and this unity then becomes one of the members of a new
multiplicity, out of which subsequent unities arise.
Whitehead's analysis of the total human organism as being a monarchy, and
not simply a democratic aggregate , is of utmost importance for the issue of human
freedom, which, besides being of central importance in its own right, is crucial
for the problem of immortality. For, unless the human soul is understood as
being in some significant sense a self-determining actuality, the idea of its continuing to live apart from the body would be meaningless. Many who are aware
of the change from Newtonian to modern physics will admit that perhaps the
person is not absolutely determined by the causal influences of the past, and
yet nevertheless hold that the human being can have freedom only in a trivial
sense. For even if one interprets the apparent indeterminancy of sub-atomic
particles in the most favorable way, this only entails that such things as individual
electrons manifest some spontaneity. But when large numbers are involved , the
indeterminancy disappears, i.e., the behavior of the group as such can be predicted.
Accordingly, it is held , since the human being is composed of a very large number
of particles, his behavior is in principle predictable.
But this interpretation rests on the ontological assumption that the human being
is simply an aggregate. But if Whitehead's position is correct, then the significance
of the fact that there is some indeterminancy (or self-determination) in the behavior of individuals is not cancelled out by the statistical predictability of aggregates. For the human person would really be an individual, not merely an
aggregate. Of course, the total human being is composed of myriads of individual
cells, and is hence a society. But these cells are subordinated to a higher-level
individual, which greatly dominates the society as a whole, giving it the unity of
action and reaction that characterizes individuals. Hence it is a "category mistake"
of the most egregious kind to assume that the same behavioral principles that apply
to a rock, which has hardly any organic unity, are in principle adequate to describe
a human being's functioning . Furthermore, as one climbs the evolutionary hierarchy
toward the higher actualities, the significance of self-determination (final causation)
increases, so that the spontaneity of the chipmunk is not simply the indeterminancy
of the electron, while the free self-determination of the human being can greatly
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exceed that of all animals with little or no capacity for symbolizing consciousness.
But the question now arises, does Whitehead 's solution of the traditional mindbody problem not preclude the possibility of the mind's existing apart from the
body? For in his view the terms "many" and "one" are strictly polar-they require
each other. That is , the notion of a unity , or a real individual, simply makes no
sense apart from a multiplicity of other actual entities, aspects of which are brought
into a new unity. In other words, an individual essentially is a unification of a
many. Whitehead's paradigm for his cosmology is the experience of the "selfenjoyment of being one among many, and of being one arising out of the composition of many."14 The experience of other things is not accidental, but essential,
to an individual. The person that endures through time is not some underlying
substance that suffers accidental experiences. Rather, the person is constituted
exhaustively of a series of occasions of experience (including their relations , of
course).15 Accordingly, the fact that experience of other things is essential to
each moment means that it is essential to the very existence of the person. And
it is clearly the case that at least a large portion of the data provided to the psyche
comes to it through the body. Hence is it conceivable that the psyche could exist
apart from this base?
Whitehead's technical term for the psyche is "living person." The double
implication of this term can be best seen by contrasting the psyche with the
molecule, on the one hand , and the living occasions of the cell, on the other.
The molecule has been defined as a serially ordered society. A synonym for serial
order is "personal order." Hence, in Whitehead 's technical sense, which stretches
the modern meaning considerably, the molecule is a "person." But it is not a
"living" person. For the molecule maintains its existence precisely by screening out
most of the novelty that appears in its individual members. Its character is maintained by virtue of the fact that every occasion prehends its predecessor in
terms of "pure physical prehensions." A physical prehension is simply a prehension of another actual entity. In a pure physical prehension the predecessor is
prehended only in terms of its physical phase. Since the physical phase is that aspect
of an occasion which simply repeats the past, while it is the mental aspect that
contains any novelty that is originated, this means that in a pure physical prehension any novelty that appeared in the predecessor occasion is largely bypassed or ignored by the successor.
Also, the molecule for the most part repeats its predecessor's form at the
expense of appropriating much from other entities in its environment. The
molecule is a person extremely narrow in its sympathies. It is mostly incapable
of being internally affected by the experiences of its companions. It simply carries
out its private project. Hence the ' molecule's self-identity is maintained by the
fact that each molecular occasion primarily receives from its predecessor only
that which the predecessor had in turn received from its predecessor, and so on.
The molecule is the perfect conservative, preferring stability to adventure, the
values of the past to the novel possibilities provided in the present.
The cell is the exact opposite. It lives. Each cellular occasion is a highly novel
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response to its environment. But, as mentioned above, the cell does not seem
to be a serially ordered society. It appropriates the experiences of its neighbors,
and lives from and for these experiences. It is the pure romantic, living only for
the present. It is a clutch at vivid immediacy. It enjoys the values of the moment,
but does not preserve the values of the past. Hence while the molecule is a
person but is not living, the cell is living but is not a person.
The full connotations of calling the psyche a living person can now be seen.
It combines life with permanence, novelty with tradition. It does this, in
Whitehead's technical terminology, in terms of "hybrid physical prehensions."
Again, each occasion of the psyche prehends its predecessors. But instead of
prehending the predecessor only in terms of its physical side, it also prehends
its mental side, and hence includes within itself some of the novelty that was
attained. Also, each occasion of the psyche prehends its neighbors, the brain cells,
and in terms of their mental phases as well , thereby appropriating the rather
significant types of novelty that these middle-grade actualities originate. 16
Accordingly, the psyche is a "person" due to the fact that a certain abstract
character or form is inherited by each member from its predecessors and transmitted to its successors . In this respect the soul is like the molecule. But the person
is "living" because this abstract form coming from the physical aspect of the
predecessor does not come near to exhausting the content of the individual occasions of experience. The novel data coming from the preceeding occasions, and
from the rest of the environment, are at least equally important.
Hence the human soul combines the best qualities of the molecule and the
cell, "best" in the sense of being conducive to the attainment of value. There is
real value in permanence, in retaining a character through time. In Whitehead's
words:
The World of Fact would dissolve into the nothingness of confusion apart
from its modes of unity derived from its preservation of dominant
characters of Value . . . . The World of Change develops Enduring Personal Identity as its effective aspect for the realization of value. Apart
from some mode of personality there is trivialization of value.17
But also the experience of novelty is necessary for significant value to be enjoyed.
The living person realizes value through both of these means. Furthermore, because of hybrid prehensions of one's own past, the novelty of one moment can
become an element in the permanent form constituting the person's character or
essence. The human being's essence is not a completely static thing, set once
and for all, but can be constantly enriched. That is , the distinction between essence
and accidents is relativized. That which is in one moment an accident can become
part of the enduring essence constituting the person's self-identity. To some
extent, we create our own essences. And the repetition over and over of that
which at first was a novelty results in a greater increase in value than is the case
where novelty is enjoyed and then fast forgotten. 18
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IV. THE POSSIBILITY OF IMMORTALITY
It is now time to pull together the various features of Whitehead 's thought
which suggests that the human soul might survive the death of its bodily organisms.
First, the psyche is an actuality, a personally ordered series of actual entities,
and hence just as "real" as the most primary type s of enduring objects. These
most primitive enduring objects are series of occasions of experience. Hence it
is not inherent to the nature of strands of experience that they require the support
of a more basic, non-experiencing material body. (Of course, we know of no
higher level experiences that exist apart from the support of lower-grade societies,
which serve as the material support. But the question is precisely whether it
might be possible for the human soul to be an exception in this regard.)
Second, the fact that living occasions of the cell cannot exist apart from the
support of its non-living parts seems to be connected for Whitehead with the
fact that they form merely a temporal nexus, and not a society. But he sees the
human psyche to be not simply a nexus, but a full-fledged personally ordered
society. The fact that the soul is tied strongly to its own distinctive past, and
anticipates its own future, gives it a partial freedom from that kind of total
dependence on the present contributions from its immediate environment that
characterizes the cell.
Third , the human soul differs from the soul of other animals in the same way.
Of course, Whitehead posits no absolute difference between the human soul and
that of animals. He says, " It is not a mere question of having a soul or of
not having a soul. The question is, How much, if any?"19 Although in the lower
forms of animal life he saw no basis for supposing the dominant occasions to be
ordered into a living person, he did think w e should conjecture a soul in the higher
animals. However, once this point against absolute dissimilarity is made , the point
about real discontinuities needs equally to be made. The world's hierarchy does not
manifest simply a gradual increase, but real jumps. The difference between life and
non-life is not an absolute difference, but a real one nevertheless. Living beings
are capable of all sorts of things completely impossible to the non-living. The
emergence of clear consciousness out of mere awareness represents another such
emergent, opening up vast new possibilities. The closely related emergence of
beings capable of understanding symbols rather than mere signals again is a
major breakthrough, freeing one from the chains of the immediate present and
allowing him to participate in infinity. The point to pull from this at the moment
is that, although the difference between the human soul and that of the other
higher animals is not absolute, it is considerable, and in some sense a difference
of kind. Included would be the degree to which the human soul is capable of
being constituted in the present by its prehensions of its own distinctive past,
whereas other animal life is in this respect more like the cell, being dependent
for its experience almost entirely on the body. Hence, it would not be entirely
implausible to suppose that the human psyche could survive apart from the
body, even though one did not suppose the same for all animal life.

Published by eCommons, 1971

53

11

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 8 [1971], No. 3, Art. 7
Fourth, the fact that each occasion of experience is something for itself, enjoying
intrinsic value, as well as being something for others, contributing instrumental
value, is important to the question. Whitehead certainly agrees with those who
stress the pragmatic function of human mentality, that its functioning is related
to the welfare of the total organism. But he also holds that at the human level
the mental experience is also often enjoyed for its own sake, that the soul enjoys
many experiences and is involved in many activities that are irrelevant to any
biological needs. Accordingly the notion that the soul's immortality is really
unthinkable. since the psyche essentially is the directive agent of the body, is
relativized. It does belong to the essence of each occasion of the soul that it
arises from a prehension of others, and that it in turn influences others. But it
also belongs to its essence that it experiences self-enjoyment. Also, all pure
physical prehensions are of the immediately contiguous occasions. Hence it is
natural that, since the soul is located in the body, most of its experience will be
derived from, and most of its influence exercised upon, the body.
Accordingly, the psyche's influence on others does not constitute its total
essence. And insofar as this instrumental functioning does belong to its essence,
there seems to be no absolute necessity that it be exercised on the same environment in which the soul originally emerged. Whitehead 's theory does seems to
require that an actuality as complex and sensitive as the human soul could not
have emerged except by being located at the focal point of a highly complex,
coordinated animal body, so organized as to contribute the majority of its data
to this focal point, and in turn to be receptive to influence from this point. But
it does not seem to require that this high-level actuality, once it has fully emerged,
would be unable to survive, and even flourish, in another environment.
Fifth, while the third point built upon the way in which the human psyche
is similar to the molecule, the way in which it differs therefrom is equally important. As discussed above, rather than blocking out most of the novel data contributed by other actualities, the psyche thrives on these experiences. These
other actualities include not only the brain cells, but also God and, at least in
principle, and probably sometimes in fact, other psyches. As to whether these
latter might provide a sufficient environment, Whitehead himself suggested the
possibility that the soul might find "a support for its existence beyond the body"
by its prehensions of God, so that "in some important sense the existence of the
soul may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organization."2o
Furthermore, although not mentioned by Whitehead, it is consistent with his
position to suggest that the important role now played by the body in providing
experiences for the soul might be filled, after separation from the body, by a
society of other souls. It has been suggested by others, of course, that the body,
while supplying the soul with certain experiences, also serves to block out one's
direct perception of other souls, at least for most people in modern civilization
most of the time. The same might be somewhat true in relation to our experience
of God. Since God is in the environment of every finite occasion of experience, He
is necessarily prehended. But man's experience of God may be somewhat hindered
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by the strength of the data contributed by the body. This idea has also, of
course, been suggested by many.
In sum, while neither molecular occasions nor cellular occasions are thought
to be capable of existing apart from the subordinate societies included in the
respective total structured societies, the human soul might be capable of existence
apart from the total structured society in which it emerged. This possibility is due
to the very high degree to which the human psyche 's self-constitution by its
positive prehensions of a large variety of others can be combined with a very
high degree of personal identity. In fact , the practice of allowing oneself to be
partly constituted by the values received from an increasing circle of others can
itself become central to one's self-identity. This is one of the important implications of the fact that one's essence can be partly created by contingent decisions.
Hence bodily death, which would mean the loss of an extremely delicate and
finely coordinated instrument for the reception of certain types of highly valuable
experiences, as well as for the expression of emotions and purposes, might also
result in the opening up of new kinds of experiences, such as more intense and
intimate experiences of God and other selves. Just as the person in the body
can have a strong sense of individuality, of himself as distinct from his body,
and yet be intimately related to the body, feeling its experiences sympathetically,
and even in a strong sense as his own, so one might in a future existence keep a
strong sense of individuality and yet overcome some of the feeling of overagainstness and externality in relation to other selves that so characterizes our present
existence.
Although Whitehead himself was evidently not much interested in this kind of
question, this type of understanding seems compatible with his thought. According
to his view, God's purpose in the world of finite actualities is to bring about ever
higher experiences of value. The evocation of novelty and new types of societies
is subservient to this purpose. Hence, if a new society could be formed of human
souls, a society in which new and even higher types of value experiences were
possible, this would be in line with the general thrust and purpose of creation.
'However the fact that something is in line with God's purpose does not settle
the question as to whether it is or will be actualized. God cannot do, by definition,
that which is impossible. It has been the purpose of this paper to lift up some of
the principles of Whitehead's philosophy that suggest that subjective immortality
may be a real possibility. The fact that Whitehead himself was little interested
in this question really increases the weight of his support rather than decreasing
it, since it can hardly be claimed that he developed his principles precisely in
order to give this support.
University of Dayton
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